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# PRIVATE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS IN AFRICA

## V1

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# EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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## CLASSIFICATION

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## SUBJECT

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Operational Baseline of Private Military Organizations (PMOs) in Africa  
(Trailing 12 Months)

## BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT

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Open-source intelligence confirmed that the African private military landscape over the last 12 months was dominated by Russian, Chinese, South African, and Turkish entities, each operating with distinct state-aligned or commercial mandates. The investigation successfully mapped the legal names, alias networks, and specific sub-national deployments of these PMOs, revealing that Russian forces prioritized regime survival and resource extraction in the Sahel, Chinese firms focused on Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure protection in East Africa, and South African groups engaged in commercial counter-insurgency. **Certainty Score: 85/100**

Extensive entity object expansion (over 10%) and the resolution of OSINT sub-project gaps regarding specific sub-national deployment zones for the Africa Corps and Chinese PMOs justified a high-confidence assessment, though precise tactical troop counts and specific financial contracts remained partially obscured.

## KEY FINDINGS

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- **Russian MoD Assimilation of Wagner:** The Russian state formally transitioned the Wagner Group [F-031] into the "Africa Corps" under the direct operational control of the Russian Ministry of Defense and military intelligence (GRU) [F-032, F-119@Private Military Organizations in Africa]. Africa Corps maintained an extensive operational footprint across the Sahel and Central Africa [F-034], specifically deploying to Ouagadougou and Loumbila in Burkina Faso [F-114@Private Military Organizations in Africa], as well as Niamey, Mali, and the Central African Republic (CAR) [F-010].
- **Chinese PMO Consolidation in East Africa:** Chinese PMOs [F-012] significantly expanded their footprint to protect state-owned assets and BRI infrastructure, prioritizing facility protection over combat [F-106]. Frontier Services Group (FSG) consolidated regional dominance by acquiring Beijing DeWe Security Service and Kenyan aviation assets [F-088@Private Military Organizations in Africa], utilizing Hong Kong as a financial hub [F-064@Private Military Organizations in Africa, F-093@Private Military Organizations in Africa] and Nairobi as a forward operational base [F-069@Private Military Organizations in Africa].
- **South African Commercial Counter-Insurgency:** South Africa continued to serve as a vital historical and contemporary hub for PMO logistics [F-014]. The highly connected Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) [F-027, F-077] extensively leveraged this infrastructure to conduct active deployments in Mozambique [F-037], specifically operating in Cabo Delgado hubs including Macomia [F-083], Pemba [F-084], and Maputo [F-085] to counter Ansar al-Sunna insurgents [F-139].
- **High-Activity Geographic Nexus Zones:** The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) functioned as a highly concentrated operational hub for multiple competing mercenary networks [F-030]. Similarly, North East Mali emerged as a critical conflict node where Russian forces repeatedly engaged insurgent coalitions [F-156].

- **Turkish PMO Structuring:** SADAT International Defense Consultancy rapidly structured its corporate entities in Turkey to facilitate international military consulting and operations [F-013, F-141].

## ENTITY OVERVIEW

ENTITY CATEGORY	KEY ORGANIZATIONS & ALIASES	OPERATIONAL JURISDICTION & SUB-NATIONAL BASES	PRIMARY OBSERVED MANDATE
<b>Russian State PMOs</b>	Africa Corps, Wagner Group, Redut, Convoy, M Invest, Bear Brigade	Burkina Faso (Loumbila, Ouagadougou), Niger (Niamey), Mali (Aguelhok), Sudan, CAR	Regime survival, proxy warfare, resource extraction (Nordgold)
<b>Chinese PMOs</b>	Frontier Services Group (FSG), Beijing DeWe Security Service, Huaxin Zhong An	Kenya (Nairobi), Djibouti, DRC, Tanzania, Zambia	BRI infrastructure defense, asset protection for State-Owned Enterprises
<b>South African PMOs</b>	Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), Executive Outcomes, Paramount Group, Umbra Aviation	Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, Macomia, Pemba), South Africa	Direct combat, counter-insurgency, aviation logistics
<b>Turkish PMOs</b>	SADAT Defense Consultancy, Akademi Sancak	Turkey, Somalia, Libya, Horn of Africa	Military consulting, host-nation force training

ENTITY CATEGORY	KEY ORGANIZATIONS & ALIASES	OPERATIONAL JURISDICTION & SUB-NATIONAL BASES	PRIMARY OBSERVED MANDATE
<b>Host/ Adversary Actors</b>	Alliance of Sahel States (AES), RSF, JNIM, ISGS, Ansar al-Sunna	Sahel region, Sudan (Darfur), Mozambique	Insurgency, host-nation agreements, localized conflict

## RELATIONSHIP MAP (NARRATIVE)

The architecture of PMOs in Africa relied heavily on complex alias networks, state-sponsorship, and shared physical infrastructure. Russian mercenary operations were fully subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense. GRU officials, prominently Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov [F-115@Private Military Organizations in Africa] and General Andrey Averyanov [F-122@Private Military Organizations in Africa], directly negotiated host-nation agreements with junta leaders like Ibrahim Traoré (Burkina Faso) and Abdourahamane Tiani (Niger) to base Africa Corps personnel. These deployments were financially sustained through overlapping corporate networks tied to Russian resource extraction entities, notably Nordgold in Burkina Faso. An operational correlation was also verified in Sudan, where the Russian-linked M Invest shared geographic footprints with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) [F-017].

Chinese operations demonstrated deep alignment with the Chinese Communist Party's strategic goals but operated distinctly from Russian kinetic forces. FSG, financially backed by the state-owned CITIC Group, absorbed regional competitors to protect China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) assets and BRI railways. Hua Xin Zhong An (HXZA) operated in Djibouti in close geographic coordination with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Support Base, illustrating a formalized civil-military integration.

In the commercial sector, the South African PMO ecosystem was driven by legacy networks, with Executive Outcomes [F-028] and WatchGuard

[F-018] historical frameworks influencing modern outfits. The Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) was contracted directly by the Mozambican government and corporate entities (TotalEnergies) to provide combat aviation support against the Islamic State's Central Africa Province and Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama in Cabo Delgado, acting as a force multiplier for local militaries. Think tanks and policy institutes like CSIS [F-020] actively monitored these complex networks to assess their impact on regional stability.

## **ASSESSMENT**

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With high confidence, the deployment of Private Military Organizations across Africa has fractured into two distinct models: state-subsidized strategic proxy forces (Russia, China, Turkey) and commercial kinetic contractors (South Africa). The absorption of Wagner into the Africa Corps represents a formalization of Russian hybrid warfare designed to outcompete Western influence while securing mineral rights. Chinese PMOs will likely continue expanding their footprint, operating strictly defensively to secure economic supply chains without engaging in host-nation internal conflicts. African states facing critical insurgencies (e.g., Mozambique, DRC) will likely continue procuring commercial PMOs like DAG to bridge tactical shortfalls in their national militaries.

## **INTELLIGENCE GAPS**

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### **OSINT Gaps**

- Specific financial compensation parameters and the exact values of resource concessions granted to Nordgold and other Russian shell companies funding the Africa Corps.
- The precise tactical deployment numbers and kinetic capabilities of Chinese PMO personnel at specific BRI infrastructure nodes.
- Comprehensive corporate records mapping the remaining decentralized alias networks of former Wagner entities that have not formally integrated into the Africa Corps.

## External Collection Gaps

- Signals intelligence (SIGINT) regarding the command and control communications between GRU handlers in Moscow and Africa Corps forward operating bases in Loumbila and Niamey.
- Human intelligence (HUMINT) detailing the coordination protocols between Chinese PMO leadership (FSG/HXZA) and the PLA Support Base in Djibouti.
- Classified satellite imagery analysis of the physical security postures and vehicle complements at Africa Corps headquarters in Ouagadougou.

## RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS

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- **Targeted Financial Tracking:** Execute a deep-dive corporate records and financial ledger analysis of Nordgold and associated Russian mining fronts in Burkina Faso and the CAR to map the Africa Corps compensation structure.
- **Corporate Network Monitoring:** Continuously monitor Hong Kong [F-064@Private Military Organizations in Africa] and Turkish trade registries to identify newly formed subsidiaries under FSG and SADAT [F-141] that may obscure future deployments.
- **Geospatial Profiling:** Task commercial and open-source satellite imagery analysis on known Africa Corps facilities in Loumbila and Niamey, as well as Chinese logistics hubs in Nairobi, to establish baseline personnel and equipment counts.